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FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 This diversity action requires us to decide under 
Pennsylvania law whether a subcontractor may recover 
against a school district for a claim of unjust enrichment.  The 
case involves a dispute over unpaid services between the 
subcontractor Wayne Moving & Storage of New Jersey 
(“Wayne Moving”) and the appellants the School District of 
Philadelphia and the School Reform Commission 
(collectively, “School District”).  Wayne Moving sued the 
School District under a theory of unjust enrichment for 
unpaid moving services.  The United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted Wayne Moving‟s 
motion for summary judgment and awarded it $830,071.18 
plus interest.  On appeal, the School District contends that 
Wayne Moving‟s claim of unjust enrichment is barred by 
Section 508 of the Pennsylvania Public School Code, which 
applies to “contracts of any kind.”  24 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 5-508.  
Appellants maintain that “contracts of any kind” include 
those contracts implied by courts in unjust enrichment claims.  
We agree and hold that those acts of the School District not in 
compliance with the provisions of Section 508 are rendered 
“void and unenforceable,” id., and cannot bind the School 
District under an implied contract of unjust enrichment.  We 
further hold that the School District is not equitably estopped 
from relying on Section 508. 
 For the following reasons, we conclude that the 
District Court‟s denial of the School District‟s motion for 
summary judgment was in error.  Accordingly, we will 
reverse the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment in 
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favor of Wayne Moving and remand for entry of summary 
judgment for the School District. 
I. 
A. 
 Wayne Moving subcontracted with Facility Strategies, 
a professional relocation consultant, to provide moving 
services for the School District.  The moving project dates 
back to 2002 when Frank Siefert, the Special Assistant to the 
Commission, suggested consolidating the School District‟s 
five administrative office buildings into one central location.  
On August 13, 2002, the School Reform Commission 
approved the purchase of 440 North Broad Street to serve as 
the new School District headquarters.  On June 16, 2004, the 
Commission authorized the School District to enter into a 
contract for moving services in an amount not to exceed $1.4 
million. 
 Facility Strategies and Wayne Moving submitted a 
proposal for just under the $1.4 million authorized amount.  
On September 1, 2004, Facility Strategies entered into a 
subcontract agreement with Wayne Moving for an amount 
not to exceed $840,115.68, and on September 24, 2004, 
Facility Strategies and the School District entered into a 
contract for an amount not to exceed $1,396,865.68. 
 The move into 440 North Broad Street encountered 
numerous difficulties involving non-functioning elevators, 
unanticipated work, and delays due to the School District‟s 
disputes with a third party.  The move was scheduled to begin 
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in January of 2005, and Facility Strategies and Wayne 
Moving contracted to complete the move by September 30, 
2005.  But it did not begin until April 2005 and most of the 
moving occurred in the final month before the deadline. 
 As a result of the delays, the project incurred 
additional expenses.  Sallyann Ferullo, President of Facility 
Strategies, inquired of Frank Siefert at the School District as 
to what should be done about the additional expenses.  Siefert 
told her, according to Ferullo‟s testimony, “[D]on‟t worry, 
just document it.  As long as we have documentation we‟ll 
take care of it at the end.”  Wayne Moving & Storage of N.J. 
v. School Dist. of Phila., No. 06-0676, 2008 WL 65611, at *1 
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2008).  Ferullo then inquired as to whether 
Facility Strategies and Wayne Moving should stop working.  
Siefert, according to Ferullo‟s testimony, responded, “Oh no. 
. . .  You got to finish.  We got to finish.”  Id.  Ferullo stated 
that she would “get it done.  Whatever it takes.”  Id. 
 Two invoices and an extra work order are at issue.  
Ferullo submitted an extra work order to the School District 
on September 20, 2005 for $384,100.  Siefert approved the 
extra work order and, according to the School District, was 
under the impression that:  the project was still within the 
$1.4 million budget; the work order only included cost 
estimates; and the order was approved only on a not-to-
exceed basis.  The District Court did not find otherwise.  Id. 
at *8. 
 Facility Strategies submitted an invoice on October 26, 
2005 for part of the work performed in September.  In a cover 
letter, Ferullo informed Siefert that Facility Strategies 
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received additional invoices from Wayne Moving and that the 
project was over the contracted amount by $158,000.  Ferullo 
also stated that she had yet to receive invoices from the last 
week of September, “the most intensive week of work.”  Id. 
at *2.  She went on to note that “[o]nce all of the invoices 
have been received, it is my understanding that you will need 
to go before the [School Reform Commission] for the 
additional funding.”  Id.  But Ferullo expressed confidence 
that the remaining expenses “will come within the projections 
that we discussed in the itemized Extra Work Order.”  Id.  
The School District paid Facility Strategies after receiving the 
invoice, and Facility Strategies subsequently paid Wayne 
Moving the full $840,116 contracted amount. 
 Facility Strategies submitted a final invoice to the 
School District on December 20, 2005 for $834,201.18, 
which included $830,071.18 for the extra work performed by 
Wayne Moving.  Wayne Moving argued that the additional 
expenses were due to the expanded scope of work and 
unanticipated impediments.  The District Court agreed and 
found that the “$830,071.00 in extra work was attributed to 
the compressed schedule, inoperable or inadequate elevators, 
and an increased scope of the work to be performed.”  Wayne 
Moving & Storage of N.J. v. School Dist. of Phila., 
No. 06-0676, 2009 WL 123781, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 
2009).  Regardless, the School District refused to pay because 
the claimed amount was in excess of the $1.4 million 
authorized by the School Reform Commission. 
 Wayne Moving did not submit additional written 
demands for payment, nor did it file suit against Facility 
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Strategies.  Wayne Moving, however, did file suit against the 
School District. 
B. 
 On February 14, 2006, Wayne Moving filed this 
lawsuit against the School District in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 
asserting claims for unjust enrichment for unpaid moving 
services in the amount of $830,071.18.  On August 15, 2006, 
the District Court denied the School District‟s motion to 
dismiss the complaint.  Both parties filed motions for 
summary judgment, and on January 3, 2008, the District 
Court granted Wayne Moving‟s motion. 
 The School District argued that Wayne Moving‟s 
claim should be denied for three reasons:  (1) the prime 
contract between the School District and Facility Strategies 
and the Request for Proposal signed by Wayne Moving 
independently bar Wayne Moving‟s claim; (2) Section 508 
prohibits unauthorized payment to Wayne Moving; and (3) 
privity of contract exists between the School District and 
Wayne Moving, preventing Wayne Moving from bringing an 
unjust enrichment claim, and the unjust enrichment claim 
rests on disputed facts.  The District Court held that the 
provisions of the prime contract were not enforceable against 
Wayne Moving because it was not a party to the contract 
between the School District and Facility Strategies.  With 
respect to the second argument, the court held that the School 
District was equitably estopped from relying on Section 508, 
reasoning that Siefert misleadingly told Ferullo to order 
Wayne Moving to perform the extra work.  Finally, the court 
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held that Wayne Moving and the School District were not in 
privity of contract and that the elements of unjust enrichment 
were met.  “Under these circumstances,” the District Court 
stated, “it would be unconscionable and grossly inequitable 
for the defendants to retain the benefits of additional moving 
services without paying for them.”  Wayne Moving, 2008 WL 
65611, at *9.  The District Court entered a judgment of 
$1,003,908.33 ($830,071.18 in unpaid moving services plus 
$173,837.33 in interest) in favor of Wayne Moving. 
 On October 2, 2009, the School District timely 
appealed, and it makes the same three arguments on appeal.  
We only reach the second issue. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1332(a) because the parties‟ citizenship was completely 
diverse and the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000.  We 
have jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review a 
decision resolving a motion for summary judgment de novo.  
Startzell v. City of Philadelphia, 533 F.3d 183, 192 (3d Cir. 
2008).  A party is entitled to summary judgment when it 
demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact 
and that the evidence establishes its entitlement to judgment 
as a matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).  In reviewing a motion 
for summary judgment, we consider all evidence in the light 
most favorable to the party opposing the motion.  Brewer v. 




 We first consider whether Section 508 of the 
Pennsylvania Public School Code bars Wayne Moving‟s 
ability to recover from the School District.  Section 508 
states: 
“The affirmative vote of a majority of all 
members of the board of school directors in 
every district, duly recorded, showing how each 
member voted, shall be required in order to take 
action on the following subjects: -- 
. . . Creating or increasing any 
indebtedness. . . . 
Entering into contracts of any 
kind . . . where the amount 
involved exceeds one hundred 
dollars ($100). . . . 
Failure to comply with the provisions of this 
section shall render such acts of the board of 
school directors void and unenforcible.” 
24 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 5-508.  This provision also applies to “any 
subsequent modifications of a contract that would increase 
the school district‟s indebtedness under that contract.”  
Hazleton Area School Dist. v. Krasnoff, 672 A.2d 858, 862 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996).  If Section 508 applies, any approval 
that Siefert may have given for additional work is rendered 
“void and unenforcible.” 
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 To determine whether Section 508 applies, we must 
examine the status of the relationship between Wayne 
Moving and the School District.  Wayne Moving is not 
arguing that the School District is contractually bound to pay 
for its services.  In that situation, Section 508 would apply 
directly.  Instead, Wayne Moving claims that no contractual 
relationship exists between them and that as a matter of 
equity the School District must pay for its services.  For 
purposes of our analysis, we assume that there is no express 
contract between Wayne Moving and the School District.
1
  
The real issue, then, is whether Section 508 applies to implied 
contracts in cases of unjust enrichment. 
 Before proceeding, we must consider the role of the 
federal courts in diversity actions.  “A federal court under 
                                                 
1
If, on the other hand, there is a contract between 
Wayne Moving and the School District, then Wayne Moving 
cannot bring a claim of unjust enrichment.  In Wilson Area 
School District v. Skepton, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania held that parties to a contract “are not entitled to 
the remedies available under a judicially-imposed quasi[-
]contract [i.e., the parties are not entitled to restitution based 
upon the doctrine of unjust enrichment] because the terms of 
their agreement (express and implied) define their respective 
rights, duties, and expectations.”  895 A.2d 1250, 1254 (Pa. 
2006) (modifications in original) (quoting Curley v. Allstate 
Ins. Co., 289 F. Supp. 2d 614, 620 (E.D. Pa. 2003)); see also 
In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 831 F.2d 1221, 1230 (3d Cir. 
1987) (holding that a party cannot assert a claim of unjust 




Erie is bound to follow state law as announced by the highest 
state court.”  Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 
253 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Edwards v. HOVENSA, LLC, 497 
F.3d 355, 361 (3d Cir. 2007)).  The Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania has yet to consider whether Section 508 applies 
to implied contracts.  In this instance, “[w]hen the state‟s 
highest court has not addressed the precise question 
presented, [we] must predict how the state‟s highest court 
would resolve the issue.”  Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 
79 F.3d 1358, 1373 n.15 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Erie R.R. Co. 
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)).  “[W]e must consider 
relevant state precedents, analogous decisions, considered 
dicta, scholarly works, and any other reliable data tending 
convincingly to show how the highest court in the state would 
decide the issue at hand.”  Covington v. Cont’l Gen. Tire, 
Inc., 381 F.3d 216, 218 (3d Cir. 2004) (quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  Moreover, 
“[w]here an intermediate appellate state court 
rests its considered judgment upon the rule of 
law which it announces, that is a datum for 
ascertaining state law which is not to be 
disregarded by a federal court unless it is 
convinced by other persuasive data that the 
highest court of the state would decide 
otherwise.” 
Sheridan, 609 F.3d at 254 (quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
 We begin our analysis with intermediate state court 
judgments and grant them “significant weight in the absence 
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of an indication that the highest state court would rule 
otherwise.”  Orson, 79 F.3d at 1373 n.15 (quoting C.I.R. v. 
Bosch’s Estate, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967)).  In Price v. School 
District of Borough of Taylor, the Superior Court of 
Pennsylvania held that a school board treasurer had no 
implied claim to compensation because he was not properly 
appointed by the school board.  42 A.2d 99, 102 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1945).  The court rested its analysis on Section 508: 
“This section is mandatory and there must be 
strict compliance with its provisions before any 
rights can be acquired against a school district. 
. . .  If the statutory methods for the 
authorization of expenditures are not pursued, a 
deserving plaintiff can have no recovery, even 
on claims of quantum meruit, for the statute 
excludes all equities and implied liabilities.” 
Id.  Likewise, In re Borough of Sykesville involved plaintiffs 
who sued a school district for unpaid work under an implied 
contract.  91 Pa. Super. 335 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1927).  The 
Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that the contractors 
could not recover due to the statutory requirement that all 
contracts must be authorized by the school board.  Id. at 341.  
“Regular official action, evidenced by official minutes, is 
what the statute requires to ground such an action as the 
present, and because it is a statutory requisition, all equities 
and implied liabilities are excluded.”  Id. (quoting Cascade 
School Dist. v. Lewis School Dist., 43 Pa. 318, 321 (Pa. 1862) 
(holding that a statute requiring school board approval for the 
enforcement of a contractual arrangement between school 
districts barred implied contracts and liabilities)). 
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 Pennsylvania courts follow the general rule that the 
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court articulated in Hazleton: 
“If the party can produce „solid proof‟ of the 
majority‟s approval of the contract, then it may 
maintain a claim for damages under that 
contract. . . .  If the party fails to satisfy this 
burden of proof, there can be no recovery 
against the school district, even on claims of 
quantum meruit.” 
672 A.2d at 862 (citations omitted).  While not reaching the 
issue of whether Section 508 applies to implied contracts, the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has interpreted the 
requirements of Section 508 as mandatory.  “To permit 
contracts to be entered into and expenditures made without 
compliance with the provisions of the act would defeat every 
object the legislature had in mind in inserting them.”  Yoder v. 
Luzerne Twp. Sch. Dist., 160 A.2d 419, 421 (Pa. 1960) 
(holding that Section 508 barred a claim for expenses in 
excess of the authorized contract, even though they were 
incurred at the direction of school directors).  We therefore 
conclude that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would 
apply Section 508 to bar claims arising from implied 
contracts. 
 This interpretation is consistent with the plain meaning 
and policy of the statute.  Section 508 applies to “contracts of 
any kind.”  24 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 5-508.  This, we find, includes 
contracts implied by law.  Since the statute‟s adoption, the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has maintained a strict 
interpretation, which serves to preserve precious money 
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reserved for public education.  Finding that Section 508 
covers implied contracts conforms with the general policy of 
the statute as articulated by the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania: 
“This statute is a valuable one, intended to 
compel the expression of each individual 
member of the school board on a subject all-
important in the public education, and this for 
the very purpose of preventing jobbery, and the 
exercise of a one-man power, in the conduct of 
our common schools; we are, therefore, not 
inclined to permit the abrogation of its force and 
efficiency by a weak construction designed to 
meet a particular case.” 
Mullen v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of DuBois Area Sch. Dist., 259 
A.2d 877, 880 (Pa. 1969) (quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  We may safely predict that the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania would apply Section 508 to bar unjust 
enrichment claims, for we are unaware of any “other 
persuasive data that the highest court of the state would 
decide otherwise.”  Sheridan, 609 F.3d at 254 (citations 
omitted). 
 Finding that Section 508 applies to claims for unjust 
enrichment, we must apply it to the facts.  Section 508 
requires school board approval for any services valued above 
$100 or “any subsequent modifications of a contract that 
would increase the school district‟s indebtedness under [the] 
contract.”  Hazleton, 672 A.2d at 862.  It is undisputed that 
the School Reform Commission did not authorize the 
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$830,071.68 claimed by Wayne Moving.  Therefore, Wayne 
Moving‟s claim of unjust enrichment is barred by Section 
508. 
IV. 
 The District Court held that even if Section 508 applies 
to implied contracts, the School District is equitably estopped 
from relying upon it.  Under Pennsylvania law, equitable 
estoppel consists of three elements:  “1) misleading words, 
conduct, or silence by the party against whom the estoppel is 
asserted; 2) unambiguous proof of reasonable reliance upon 
the misrepresentation by the party asserting estoppel; and 3) 
the lack of a duty to inquire on the party asserting the 
estoppel.”  Chester Extended Care Ctr. v. Pennsylvania Dep’t 
of Pub. Welfare, 586 A.2d 379, 382 (Pa. 1991).  We disagree 
with the District Court and hold that Wayne Moving has 
failed to demonstrate the necessary elements of equitable 
estoppel. 
 We must first determine whether equitable estoppel 
can be applied against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania or 
its subdivisions.  The District Court correctly stated that 
equitable estoppel can be so applied, even where doing so 
would violate a statute or ordinance, such as Section 508.  
Wayne Moving, 2008 WL 65611, at *8; see, e.g., Chester 
Extended Care Ctr., 586 A.2d at 382 (“The doctrine of 
estoppel is an equitable remedy that may be asserted against 
the government in this jurisdiction.”).  But “[i]t is also the law 
of Pennsylvania that the Commonwealth or its subdivisions 
and instrumentalities cannot be estopped „by the acts of its 
agents and employees if those acts are outside the agent‟s 
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powers, in violation of positive law, or acts which require 
legislative or executive action.‟”  Cent. Storage & Transfer 
Co. v. Kaplan, 410 A.2d 292, 294 (Pa. 1980) (quoting 
Kellams v. Pub. Sch. Emp. Ret. Bd., 403 A.2d 1315, 1318 (Pa. 
1979)).  The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania resolved the 
tension between these principles in holding that “[a]lthough it 
is the general rule that estoppel against the government will 
not lie where the acts of its agents are in violation of positive 
law, . . . this rule cannot be slavishly applied where doing so 
would result in a fundamental injustice.”  Chester Extended 
Care Ctr., 586 A.2d at 383 (citation omitted). 
 There is no evidence in the record that the School 
District misled Wayne Moving, nor is there “unambiguous 
proof” that Wayne Moving reasonably relied upon or was 
even notified of any misrepresentations of the School District.  
Moreover, the requirement that actions of the School District 
must rise to the level of a “fundamental injustice” imposes a 
demanding threshold that has not been met.  Instead, the 
general rule of Pennsylvania should be applied.  Wayne 
Moving cannot assert estoppel against the School District, a 
subdivision of the Commonwealth, by the acts of its agent 
Frank Siefert because those acts require legislative or 
executive action and do not rise to the level of a fundamental 
injustice. 
 We start with the record.  The closest Siefert comes to 
making a misleading statement is found in Ferullo‟s 
testimony, where she stated that Siefert told Facility 
Strategies, “don‟t worry, just document it.  As long as we 
have documentation we‟ll take care of it at the end.”  Wayne 
Moving, 2008 WL 65611, at *1.  Addressing Facility 
 
17 
Strategies‟ question of whether they should stop working on 
the project, Siefert then allegedly told Ferullo, “Oh no. . . .  
You got to finish.  We got to finish.”  Id.  Even these 
statements, though, are ambiguous.  If this was said with the 
understanding that all expenses would be within the 
authorized amount, then Siefert is not misleading Facility 
Strategies or Wayne Moving into believing that they would 
receive payment. 
 Wayne Moving may also claim that Siefert‟s silence 
was misleading.  Siefert failed to respond to Ferullo‟s 
statement in her letter of October 26, 2005 that “[o]nce all of 
the invoices have been received, it is my understanding that 
you will need to go before the [School Reform Commission] 
for the additional funding.”  Instead, Siefert waited until 
receiving the final invoice before informing Facility 
Strategies that he would not seek approval for the additional, 
unauthorized payments.  This, however, fails to meet the 
threshold of a “fundamental injustice.”  Siefert claims that he 
was under the impression that the project would be within the 
$1.4 million authorized amount until he received the last 
invoice.  At this point in our analysis, it is informative to look 
at Pennsylvania case law where courts have held that the 
Commonwealth committed a fundamental injustice in 
misleading the plaintiff and inducing reliance. 
 Findings of fundamental injustice are generally limited 
to cases “involving unusual situations” and particularly 
egregious behavior.  Carroll v. City of Phila., Bd. of Pensions 
& Ret. Mun. Pensions Fund, 735 A.2d 141, 146 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 1999).  In Chester, a State agency misled a nursing home 
facility into believing that it was eligible for the federal 
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Medical Assistance program.  586 A.2d at 382.  The State 
agency “continued to reimburse appellant for the skilled 
nursing care of its Medical Assistance patients,” “never made 
any effort to remove Medical Assistance patients,” 
“continued to send additional Medical Assistance patients to 
appellant‟s facilities,” and “never informed appellant that [the 
federal government] considered its termination . . . 
irrevocable.”  Id. at 382.  Unlike Chester, where the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania held that there was “no dispute that 
[the State agency] mislead appellant,” id., the record before 
us fails to indicate that Siefert committed a fundamental 
injustice against Wayne Moving. 
 An additional difficulty facing Wayne Moving‟s claim 
is that none of the statements made by Siefert were directed 
towards Wayne Moving, and there is no evidence that Wayne 
Moving was informed of Siefert‟s statements.  In Chester and 
Cameron Manor, Inc. v. Department of Public Welfare, the 
government‟s misleading communications were made directly 
to the plaintiff.  586 A.2d at 382; 681 A.2d 836, 841 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1986) (holding that the plaintiff was “misled by 
several assurances” from the government that directly 
induced reasonable reliance).  Moreover, the communications 
induced reasonable reliance, creating “unambiguous proof of 
reasonable reliance upon the misrepresentation.”  Id.  Here, 
the School Board communicated to Facility Strategies, which 
was fully informed of the authorization requirement. 
 Facility Strategies, in its independent judgment, 
decided to proceed with the project, and only then was Wayne 
Moving induced to rely upon a belief that it would be paid for 
its services.  At that point, Wayne Moving was relying upon 
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the statements made by Facility Strategies, which interpreted 
its obligations under the prime contract and calculated the 
likelihood of payment.  The intervening cause and 
independent judgment of Facility Strategies therefore 
distinguish this case from those where Pennsylvania courts 
have found a fundamental injustice with unambiguous proof 
of reasonable reliance.  While Wayne Moving had no direct 
conversations with Siefert, it could not rely upon the 
statements or representations made by Siefert to Facility 
Strategies.  Wayne Moving should have known that Siefert 
did not have the power to approve expenditures beyond those 
approved by the Board.  In fact, Stanley MacHugh, the 
business manager of Wayne Moving, testified that he 
understood that extra work orders would have to be approved 
by the School Board and that Facility Strategies notified him 
of this fact at the time of the extra work order.  (App. A855.)  
Wayne Moving therefore should have been aware that private 
companies that do business with the School District “do so at 
their own peril” and have an affirmative responsibility to 
“inquire into the powers of the [School District] and its agents 
to enter into any contracts.”  City of Scranton v. Heffler, 
Radetich & Saitta, LLP, 871 A.2d 875, 879 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2005), appeal denied, 897 A.2d 1184 (Pa. 2006).  We deny 
equitable estoppel because the School District did not mislead 
by “words, conduct, or silence” and there is no “unambiguous 
proof of [Wayne Moving‟s] reasonable reliance.”  Chester 
Extended Care Ctr., 586 A.2d at 382.  We need not reach the 
issue of whether Wayne Moving lacked a duty to inquire, the 
third element of equitable estoppel. 
 Holding that equitable estoppel does not apply to the 
facts of this case is in conformity with the general position of 
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Pennsylvania courts with respect to Section 508.  In a case 
with similar facts involving a contractor who was induced to 
perform extra work and relied upon assurances from 
government officials that equitable compensation would be 
provided, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania held that 
“individual members of the School Board could not have 
bound the School District absent majority approval.”  
Hazleton, 672 A.2d at 863.  Pennsylvania courts have abided 
by the general rule derived from Section 508 that “[a]ction by 
the board is indispensable, and no liability can be imposed 
upon a school district without it.”  Matevish v. Sch. Dist. of 
Borough of Ramey, 74 A.2d 797, 800 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1950) 
(holding that a school board official‟s modification of 
contract was uneforceable because it was not approved by a 
majority of the school board).  An early case involving the 
application of what is today Section 508 articulates the 
position of Pennsylvania courts.  In Waltman v. Albany 
Township School District, an unsuspecting school teacher was 
induced into working without a valid contract.  The Superior 
Court of Pennsylvania stated that they “appreciate the 
hardship and disappointment that the plaintiff may experience 
by reason of this decision . . . but we cannot allow or permit, 
the hardships of an individual case to override and overcome 
the plain requirements of the act of assembly.”  64 Pa. Super. 
458, 467-68 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1915).  While Wayne Moving is 
certainly a sympathetic plaintiff who performed valuable 
services for the School District, Wayne Moving cannot 
receive compensation for its services because the additional 
expenses were not authorized by a majority of the School 




 The School District also argues that Wayne Moving‟s 
claim for unjust enrichment is barred by contract provisions 
found in the prime contract between the School District and 
Facility Strategies and that the elements of unjust enrichment 
have not been sufficiently established.  Because we dispose of 
this case on the grounds that Section 508 of the Pennsylvania 
Public School Code bars Wayne Moving‟s claim for unjust 




 We conclude that the District Court‟s grant of Wayne 
Moving‟s motion for summary judgment and denial of the 
School District‟s motion for summary judgment were in error.  
We direct entry of summary judgment for the School District.  
                                                 
2
 The School District argued that Wayne Moving‟s 
unjust enrichment claim was separately barred by the terms of 
the subcontract between Wayne Moving and Facility 
Strategies.  Specifically, the subcontract contained an 
incorporation clause that, the School District argued, 
incorporated the “Waiver Provisions” contained in the 
primary Relocation Contract between Facility Strategies and 
the School District.  These waiver provisions prohibited all 
legal claims against the School District arising from the 
contracted-for services.  Because we determine that Wayne 
Moving‟s unjust enrichment claim is barred by Section 508, 
we need not address nor decide whether the subcontract 
incorporated the prime contract between the School District 
and Facility Strategies or whether Wayne Moving‟s claim is 
separately barred by the relevant contractual provisions. 
 
22 
 Accordingly, we will reverse and remand for entry of 
summary judgment for the School District. 
